JR HAULING SERVICES AND OSCAR MAPUE, PETITIONERS, VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO, RAMIL JERUSALEM, ARMANDO PARUNGAO, RAFAEL CAPAROS, JR., NORIEL SOLAMO, ALFREDO SALANGSANG, MARK PARUNGAO AND DEAN V. CALVO, RESPONDENTS.

National Power Corporation Vs. Sps. Conchita Malapascua-Malijan and Lazaro Malijan/Conchita Malapascua-Malijan and Lazaro Malijan Vs. National Power Corporation
G.R. No. 211731/G.R. No. 211818. December 7, 2016

National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) sought to expropriate a 3,907-square-meter portion of a property owned by the Spouses Conchita Malapascua-Malijan and Lazaro Malijan (the Spouses Malijan) located at Barangay San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas and covered by Tax Declaration No. 15032. An expropriation case was, therefore, filed with the RTC, Branch 6 of Tanauan City, Batangas.

The Spouses Malijan did not interpose any objection to the expropriation of the property, hence, the sole issue that needed to be resolved was the determination of the just compensation.

According to NAPOCOR, the taking of the property occurred in 1972 whereas the institution of the complaint was made thirty-four (34) years after, hence, the just compensation should be based on the value of the property in 1972.

1.    In relation to expropriation proceedings, define “just compensation.”

Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.

2.    The respondents argued that there was no taking as the right-of-way that NAPOCOR was enjoying was only due to the long tolerance on their part and not by the complete dominion of NAPOCOR to the exclusion of others. Rule on the contention.

The contention was untenable.

It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

3.    In this case, when may just compensation be computed?

Just compensation must be computed based on the fair market value of the subject property at the time of the taking in 1972 plus legal interest.

4.    What is the proper legal interest applicable in this case?

Law, Rule and Regulations, BSP Issuances	Date of Effectivity	Interest Rate
Act No. 2655	1-May-16	6%
CB Circular No. 416	29-Jul-74	12%
CB Circular No. 905	22-Dec-82	12%
CB Circular No. 799	1-Jul-13	6%

5.    May exemplary or corrective damages be imposed against NAPOCOR for filing the case 34 years afer the taking?

No.

Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." As this court has stated in the past: "Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour."

It must be remembered that in this case, it was NAPOCOR who filed a complaint for eminent domain, albeit after a long period of time. This means that NAPOCOR does not have any intention of causing any harm to the landowners nor its action can be considered as socially deleterious in its consequence.

6.    May award of attorney's fees be given in this case?

No.

The award of attorney's fees is also unwarranted because of the lack of factual and legal justification. An award of attorney's fees has always been the exception rather than the rule. To start with, attorney's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of attorney's fees to the winning party. The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Too, such fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Indeed, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages. But even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's fees may still be withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. And lastly, the trial court must make express findings of fact and law that would bring the suit within the exception. What this demands is that the factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.

7.    What should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45?

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.

8.    Distinguish questions of law from questions of fact.

As distinguished from a question of law - which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" - "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."

9.    What are the exceptions to Rule 45?

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.