Alma
Covita Vs. SSM Maritme Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 206600. December 7, 2016
G.R. No. 206600. December 7, 2016
Rolando was medically repatriated on May 23, 2009 and died on September
20, 2009. Petitioner claims that Rolando's death was due to a work-related
illness. The petitioner alleged that Rolando was only on board the vessel for
seven days when he was diagnosed with chronic renal failure, and Rolando’s
death occurred during the term of his employment contract and work-related;
thus, Rolando’s death is not compensable.
In Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, chronic renal failure is
described in the following manner:
Chronic renal
failure results from progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons,
regardless of cause (Chap. 237). This diagnosis implies that GFR is known to
have been reduced for at least 3 to 6 months (see Table 233-1). Often a gradual
decline in GFR occurs over a period of years. Proof of chronicity is also
provided by the demonstration of bilateral reduction of kidney size by scout
film, ultrasonography, intravenous pyelography, or tomography. Other findings
of long-standing renal failure, such as renal osteodyastrophy or symptoms of
uremia, also help to establish this syndrome. Several laboratory abnormalities
are often regarded as reliable indicators of chronicity of renal disease, such
as anemia, hyperphosphatemia or hypocalcemia, but there are not specific (Chap.
235). In contrast, the finding of broad casts in the urinary sediment (Chap.
44) is specific for chronic renal failure, the wide diameters of these casts
reflecting the compensatory dilation and hypertrophy of surviving nephrons.
Protenuria is a frequent but nonspecific finding, as is hematuria. Chronic
obstructive uropathy polycystic and medullary cystic disease, analgesic
nephrophaty, and the inactive end stage of any chronic tubulointerstitial
nephrophaty are conditions in which the urine often contains little or no
protein cells, or casts even though nephron destruction has progressed to
chronic renal failure.
During the course of the litigation, the NLRC and the CA's factual
findings are conflicting with that of the LA.
1. What are the
requisites of death compensation and benefits under Section 20(A) of the 2000
POEA Standard Employment Contract?
To be entitled for
death compensation and benefits from the employer, the death of the seafarer
(1) must be work-related; and (2) must happen during the term of the employment
contract.
SECTION 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND
BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In the case of
work-related death of the seafarer during the tern of his contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the
amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of
Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one
(21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.
xxxx
4. The other
liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related
injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
xxxx
c. The employer
shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent
to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the
exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
2. Define work-related
illness
A work-related
illness is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract as any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied,
to wit: (1) The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein; (2) The
disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described
risks; (3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) There was no notorious
negligence on the part of the seafarer. It is also provided under Section
20B(4) of the same contract that illnesses not listed in Section 32-A are
disputably presumed work-related. However, Section 20 should be read together
with the conditions specified by Section 32-A for an illness to be compensable.
3. Is Rolando’s death
compensable?
No.
Rolando was
medically repatriated on May 23, 2009 and died on September 20, 2009. It is
provided under Section 18B(1) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract that the
employment of the seafarer is terminated when he arrives at the point of hire
and signs off and is disembarked for medical reasons. Hence, when Rolando was
medically repatriated on May 23, 2009, his contract of employment with
respondents was effectively terminated. Considering that Rolando’s death did
not occur during the term of his employment contract and not work-related, his
death is not compensable.
4. Petitioner cannot
just contend that while her husband has chronic renal failure is not listed as
an occupational disease, it is disputably presumed work-related, and it is for
respondents to overcome such presumption. Rule on the contention.
Petitioner still
has to prove her claim for death compensation with substantial evidence or such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
[T]he disputable
presumption provision in Section 20(B) does not allow him to just sit down and
wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he
still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability
compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and
that it must have existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot
simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent company.
5. Petitioner alleged
that the strenuous demands of Rolando's shipboard duties were the cause of his Illness.
Is the Petitioner correct?
No.
Mere allegation
that the strenuous demands of Rolando's shipboard duties were the cause of his
illness and nothing more, is not sufficient to declare that the same is
work-related or work-aggravated. It is settled that probability of
work-connection must at least be anchored on credible information and not on
self-serving allegations. Indeed, petitioner cannot simply allege without
adequate proof that Rolando's working conditions had caused the latter's
illness or aggravated the same.
Moreover, it bears
stressing that Rolando was only on board the vessel for seven days when he was
diagnosed with chronic renal failure which is a progressive deterioration of
the kidney function which happens over a period of time, therefore, it cannot
be absolutely declared that he developed such illness during that short period
in respondents' vessel.
6. Petitioner claims
that the fact that Rolando stayed only in respondents' vessel for one week with
his last contract is of no moment as he was able to finish his eight-month
contract with respondents prior to his last contract; that there is a big
possibility that he had contracted such illness in his previous assignment with
the respondents. Rule on the contention.
The contention is
untenable.
Rolando's
employment as a seafarer is governed by the contract he signs every time he is
rehired and his employment is terminated when his contract expires. Therefore,
his contract with respondents was considered automatically terminated after the
expiration of each overseas employment contract. If Rolando was already
suffering from chronic renal failure when he began his last contract with
respondents, his illness during his previous contract with respondents is
deemed pre-existing during his subsequent contract. Hence, his death arising
from a pre-existing illness is not compensable as he did not acquire it during
the term of his last employment contract with respondents.
7. Does pre-existence
of an illness irrevocably bar compensability?
No.
While it is true
that the pre-existence of an illness does not irrevocably bar compensability
because disability laws still grant the same provided the seafarer's working
conditions bear causal connection with his illness, these rules, however,
cannot be asserted perfunctorily by the claimant as it is incumbent upon him to
prove, by substantial evidence, as to how and why the nature of his work and
working conditions contributed to and/or aggravated his illness. Rolando was
only on board the vessel for seven days and there was no substantial evidence
to prove how his job as a bosun or his working conditions had aggravated his
illness which caused his death.
8. Is the
Pre-employment Medical Examination (PEME) a conclusive proof to show that one
is free from any ailment prior to his deployment?
No.
The PEME is nothing
more than a summary examination of the seafarer's physiological condition. The
"fit to work" declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to
show that one is free from any ailment prior to his deployment. As discussed in
Masangcay v. Trans Global Maritime Agency Inc., the decrease of GFR, which is
an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function
test, and in pre-employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which
is normally included, measures only the creatinine, the presence of which
cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.
9. Explain Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court in relation to labor cases.
It is a settled
rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised in this Court. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor
tribunal has based its determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is
not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.
Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings of facts
and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the
NLRC and the CA. The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because
their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters.
10. In this case, may
the Supreme Court grant review of factual findings.
Yes. Since the NLRC
and the CA's factual findings are conflicting with that of the LA, the Supreme
Court may review the petition.
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